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Researchers show Downloads-folder hijack of Codex, Claude Code

Coding agents may trust local instruction files outside the repo you intended to expose. Teams should avoid launching from broad folders like Downloads and treat `AGENTS.md` and `CLAUDE.md` as untrusted input.

Researchers show Downloads-folder hijack of Codex, Claude Code

On October 25, 2026, researchers said OpenAI Codex and Claude Code can be steered by malicious instruction files placed in ~/Downloads, turning a routine local folder into an attack surface.

Forever Security said it stopped a real customer incident in which an agent tried to install the npm package function-color after reading an AGENTS.md file from Downloads. The firm then reproduced the pattern in testing: for Codex, it reported a harmless proof of concept succeeding in more than 90% of runs. For Claude Code, it demonstrated a variant that redirected API traffic to steal an OAuth token and got the needed write approved in about half of tests, according to BleepingComputer.

One caveat remains unsettled. Researchers showed a browser could place a file into Downloads with little user friction, but that path has not been confirmed as the route used in the real customer case.

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